Comments on: Instant Runoff on KUOW (NPR Seattle) http://blog.robla.net/2004/instant-runoff-on-kuow-npr-seattle/ Just like a diary, only without a way to dot the i's with hearts; robla, margl, and hazel's blog Tue, 03 Jan 2012 10:06:20 +0000 hourly 1 By: CLAY SHENTRUP http://blog.robla.net/2004/instant-runoff-on-kuow-npr-seattle/comment-page-1/#comment-1349 CLAY SHENTRUP Wed, 20 Dec 2006 06:23:35 +0000 http://blog.robla.net/2004/instant-runoff-on-kuow-npr-seattle/#comment-1349 This is quite correct. IRV is unnecessarily complex, and has higher Bayesian regret (produces lower average voter satisfaction) than any other common voting method besides plurality. Bayesian regret calculations show that voters will be most satisfied, on average, with range voting. Here are some sample numbers from some simulations. Note that range voting is as much of an improvement over plurality as plurality is over random selection of the winner! Range voting is also much simpler than ranked order methods like IRV and Condorcet. You just score every candidate, and the candidate with the highest average score wins. _Voting system Regret A Regret B_ Magically elect optimum winner 0 0 Range (honest voters) 0.04941 0.05368 Borda (honest voters) 0.13055 0.10079 Approval (honest voters) 0.20575 0.16549 Condorcet-LR (honest voters) 0.22247 0.14640 IRV (honest voters) 0.32314 0.23786 Plurality (honest voters) 0.48628 0.37884 Range & Approval (strategic exaggerating voters) 0.31554 0.23101 Borda (strategic exaggerating voters) 0.70219 0.48438 Condorcet-LR (strategic exaggerating voters) 0.86287 0.58958 IRV (strategic exaggerating voters) 0.91522 0.61072 Plurality (strategic voters) 0.91522 0.61072 Elect random winner 1.50218 1.00462 -- http://rangevoting.org/UniqBest.html Check out http://RangeVoting.org for more information. This is quite correct. IRV is unnecessarily complex, and has higher Bayesian regret (produces lower average voter satisfaction) than any other common voting method besides plurality. Bayesian regret calculations show that voters will be most satisfied, on average, with range voting. Here are some sample numbers from some simulations. Note that range voting is as much of an improvement over plurality as plurality is over random selection of the winner! Range voting is also much simpler than ranked order methods like IRV and Condorcet. You just score every candidate, and the candidate with the highest average score wins.

_Voting system Regret A Regret B_

Magically elect optimum winner 0 0
Range (honest voters) 0.04941 0.05368
Borda (honest voters) 0.13055 0.10079
Approval (honest voters) 0.20575 0.16549
Condorcet-LR (honest voters) 0.22247 0.14640
IRV (honest voters) 0.32314 0.23786
Plurality (honest voters) 0.48628 0.37884
Range & Approval (strategic exaggerating voters) 0.31554 0.23101
Borda (strategic exaggerating voters) 0.70219 0.48438
Condorcet-LR (strategic exaggerating voters) 0.86287 0.58958
IRV (strategic exaggerating voters) 0.91522 0.61072
Plurality (strategic voters) 0.91522 0.61072
Elect random winner 1.50218 1.00462

– http://rangevoting.org/UniqBest.html

Check out http://RangeVoting.org for more information.

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